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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
It is not surprising that the School District and the Hennefers have some 
differences on the interpretation of the evidence. However, the Hennefers agree with 
Judge Elgee that there was "substantial agreement among the experts of what 
happened here." (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1289.) On appeal, the issue is whether there was 
substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict. There can be no dispute the jury's 
verdict is supported by substantial evidence. 
The School District attacks the expert testimony of Dr. Gill asserting that it 
addresses on!y the "state of mind" of Mr. Lopez and Austin Hennefer and that it is only 
"specuiation." However, Dr. Gill's testimony was used to explain the actual testimony of 
the other witnesses. The use of Dr. Gill was entirely consistent with Rules of Evidence 
702 and 703. 
First, Dr. Gill helped explain the discrepancy between Mr. Lopez' statements that 
when he first saw the Buick it was off the road and the testimony from Jennifer Mares 
that they stayed on the road. 
Mr. Lopez told Raul Ornelas at the crash site immediately after the crash that: 
He (Lopez) noticed a vehicle off the side of the road up ahead of him. Mr. 
Lopez told me that he - as he got closer, he slowed down, and as he got 
really close up to the vehicle he moved over to his right - I mean to his 
left, towards the center of the road. I remember Mr. Lopez was shaking 
his head. He goes, I don't know why they did it, but the car turned in front 
of me." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 371, II. 10 -17.) (Emphasis added.) 
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Other evidence, primarily the testimony of Jennifer Mares, indicated the drivers 
training car was never off the roadway at all. Therefore, it was necessary to reconcile 
the testimony of Mr. Lopez that he saw a red light "off the side of the road" and Mares 
that they executed a three-point turn in the road. The expert testimony of Dr. Gill helped 
explain that in the dark and due to the curve in the road, only the marker light would be 
visible and it appeared to be off to the right from a distance. Once the Lopez headlights 
illuminated the Buick, Mr. Lopez recognized it was in the westbound lane of the road in 
a perpendicular position. Mr. Lopez steered left to avoid the car but according to Mr. 
Lopez the car "turned in front of me" 1,,vhicn is entirely consistent with the Buick 
attempting to complete the three-point turn into the eastbound lane. Dr. Gill was not 
speculating or attempting to read minds. She was only helping the jury to understand 
Mr. Lopez' testimony in light of the darkness, orientation of the car, and the roadway 
characteristics, which were in evidence. 
Dr. Gill also helped explain the testimony of Jennifer Mares, Brian Johns, and 
Jeff Mecham. Ms. Mares testified Mr. Mecham instructed Austin Hennefer to perform a 
three-point turn. (Mares testimony, Tr., Vol. I, p. 480, II. 22 - 24.) Brian Johns testified: 
Q: Is that one of the ways that you get control of the kids? 
A: It is. They are shocked that they can fail purely for attitude, but that's 
an important part of safe driving is a good attitude. 
Q: Would attitude include doing what your instructor tells you to do when 
he te!ls you to do it? 
A: !t could. (Tr., Vol. ! of II, Part 2, p. 623, !I. 16 -23.) (Emphasis added.) 
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Jeff Mecham also testified Austin Hennefer trusted Mr. Mecham and did what Mr. 
Mecham told him to do like his other students. 
Q: Do you think Austin trusted you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you have reason to think that they trusted you? Did they do what 
you told them to do? 
A: They never had done anything different. 
Q: They had always done what you asked them to do? 
A: Yes. (Tr. Vol. II of 11, p. 952, II. 13-19.) 
Dr. Gill helped explain the scientific basis for why students obey the commands 
of an instructor. Dr. Gili's testimony was entirely consistent with the testimony of 
Jennifer Mares, Brian ,johns. and Jeff Mecham. It was simply offered to assist the triei 
of fact to understand the evidence. It was neither "speculative" nor "state of mind" 
evidence. 
Substantial evidence supports the Hennefers' claims that Mr. Mecham instructed 
Austin Hennefer to perform a three-point turn on Highway 20 on icy roads in darkness 
and directly in front of an oncoming car. The Lopez Honda's headlights would have 
been visible to Mr. Mecham and Mr. Mecham testified he looked over his left shoulder 
as they were pulling off to the right side of the iOad. He also testified he recalls looking 
over his left shoulder and seeing headlights coming. 
(Mecham testimony) We would have turned the signai to the right, and I 
would have had them pull off halfway off the road. Then we would have 
come to a complete stop. I would have them check over their left 
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shoulder. I would have also checked over my left shoulder. (Tr., Vol. II of 
II, p. 924, II. 11 - 15.) (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Mecham also testified he recalls looking over his left shoulder and seeing 
headlights coming. 
Q: (By Hepworth) So you remember looking over your left shoulder? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you remember seeing headlights coming? 
A: Yes. (Tr., Vol. II of II, p. 942, II. 21 - 25.) (Emphasis added.) 
The Hennefers have never characterized the traffic as "heavy" but there were 
clearly numerous cars on the road and it was during normal commute hour. The 
School District apparently admits the existence of the driveway near the crash site but 
claims "there is no evidence that the one driveway was visible to Mr. Mecham at the 
time of the accident.'; (Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 3.) The School District makes the 
argument despite the testimony of Dennis Hennefer that the "driveway and this yard has 
a big yard light, and in the dark it shows that yard up like a beacon." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 339, 
II. 4 - 6.) The Court is also requested to examine the police photos admitted into 
evidence Ex. 15. 7 and Ex. 15. 13, which prove the proximity of the farmhouse driveway 
to the crash site. 
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II. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
A. THE "WILLFUL OR RECKLESS" INSTRUCTION WAS CORRECT 
I.C. § 6-1603(4)(a) provides that the limitation on non-economic damage does 
not apply where the cause of action arises out of "willful or reckless misconduct." The 
School District incorrectly claims "The Hennefers do not contest that the jury instruction 
was incorrect" despite the heading of the brief section entitled "The Court's Reckless 
Instruction was Correct." The Hennefers have no explanation for the School District's 
misrepresentation and again emphasize the reckless instruction was indeed cmrect 
based upon the iongstanding and recently reaffirmed law. The School District has 
ignored Idaho law. Idaho has long used the Restatement of Torts definition of 
"reckless." 
In 1958 the Idaho Supreme Court relied on the First Restatement of Torts 
definition of reckless misconduct in Hunter v. Horton, 80 Idaho 475 (1958). 
Reckless misconduct differs from negligence in several important 
particulars. It differs from that form of negligence which consists in mere 
inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take 
precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a possible or 
probable future emergency in that reckless misconduct requires a 
conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the 
serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which 
would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. 2 Restatement of the 
Law of Torts§ 500g. Hunter v. Horton, 80 Idaho 475 at 480 (1958). 
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In 2012 the Idaho Supreme Court again relied on the Restatement of Torts§ 500 
in describing the legal standard for "willful or reckless" specifically in reference to I.C. § 
6-1603(4)(a). 
We affirm the trial court and hold that willful or reckless misconduct is a 
form of negligence that involves both intentional conduct and knowledge 
of a substantiai risk of harm. Carillo v. Boise Tire Co .. Inc~, 152 Idaho 741 
at 751 (2012). 
The Court in Carillo then goes on to quote State v. Papse, 83 Idaho 358 (1961) 
which quoted the Restatement (First) of Torts § 500 cmt.g (1934). The lengthy quote 
was previously set forth on page 23 of the Hennefers' initial brief and need not be 
repeated here. However, it is important to note that the Second and Third Restatement 
of Torts comments further clarify what is reckless conduct and are helpful. 
§ 500 Reckless Disregard of safety Defined. The actor's conduct is in 
reckiess disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionaliy 
fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having 
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not 
only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to 
another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is 
necessary to make his conduct negligent. § 500 Restatement of the Law 
Second Torts § 500 p. 587. 
This definition and Idaho case law is entirely consistent with the tiial court's 
instruction on "willful or reckless" which was the Idaho Pattern Jury Instruction 2.25. 
This was the instruction recommended by a "select committee of judges and lawyers" 
which drafted the IDJl2d instruction ''upon order of the Supreme Court." (See Idaho 
Jury Instructions 2003 version a. Preface to IDJI 2d.) 
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It is also important to consider comment d to the Second Restatement. It is not 
necessary to prove Mr. Mecham actually saw the Lopez vehicle. It is sufficient to prove 
Mr. Mecham had knowledge of others within the danger zone. 
d. Knowledge of presence of others within danger zone. If the actor's 
conduct is such to involve a high degree of risk that serious harm will 
result from it to anyone who is within range of its effect, the fact that he 
knows or has reason to know that others are within such range is 
conclusive of the recklessness of his conduct toward them. It is not, 
however, necessary that the actor know that there is anyone within the 
area made dangemus by his conduct. It is enough that he knows that 
there is strong probability that others may rightfully come within such 
zone. Restatement of Torts 2nd § 500, comment d, p. 589. 
It is also important to understand the distinction between reckless conduct and 
intentional misconduct. 
f. Intentional misconduct and recklessness contrasted. Reckless 
misconduct differs from intentional wrongdoing in a very important 
particular. While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the 
actor does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough 
that he realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that there is 
a strong probability that harm may result, even though he hopes or even 
expects that his conduct will prove harmless. However, a strong 
probability is a different thing from the substantial certainty without which 
he cannot be said to intend the harm in which his act resuits. 
It is also helpful to consider the Restatement (Third) of Torts description of 
recklessness. 
A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if: 
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows 
facts that make the risk obvious to another in the person's situation, and 
(b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens 
that are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the 
person's failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person's 
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indifference to the risk. Restatement (Third) of Torts; Liability for Physical 
and Emotional Harm§ 2 (2010). 
B. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF WILLFUL OR RECKLESS 
MISCONDUCT 
The School District argues there was no substantial evidence supporting the 
jury's and trial court's finding of recklessness. Like Mr. Mecham, the School District fails 
to consider its own teaching materials that address turnabouts. Mr. Mecham was taught 
by Mr. Johns using the Drive Right Manual. The Drive Right Manual was used by Mr. 
Mecham. Therefore, the evidence shows Mr. Mecham had actual knowledge of the 
lessons he taught. Very important excerp1s include: 
1. Objectives. 
4. Describe five .turnabouts and tell which is the safest to use. (Ex. 77, p. 
113.) 
2. Turning the Vehicle Around .... 
Take these precautions when you plan to make a turnabout: 
--Never attempt a turnabout in heavy or high-speed traffic. (Ex. 77. P. 
·116.) (Emphasis added.) 
3. Three-Point Turnabout This turnabout is hazardous to perform. You not only 
cross traffic lanes, but your vehicle is stopped across a traffic lane. Executing 
this maneuver may put you in a high-risk situation. (Ex.77, p.118.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
4. Deciding Which Turnabout to Use. A three-point turnabout should rarely be 
used. Use this turnabout only when you are on a dead end street or on a 
rural roadway with no driveways. (Ex. 77, p.118). 
Utilizing the Restatement comments as a guide, it is clear there is substantial 
evidence of recklessness. The Hennefers presented direct evidence that Mr. Mecham 
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was taught to make a "route plan" in advance of driving. There is evidence Mr. Mecham 
decided in advance to drive 30 minutes west on Highway 20 and execute a three-point 
turn. Mr. Mecham knew it was his job responsibility to teach the "safest turnabout" to 
his students but instead chose to practice a "hazardous" turnabout that "may put you in 
a high risk situation." He was taught to "never attempt a turnabout in high speed traffic" 
but clearly knew Highway 20 had a 65 mph speed limit. 
There is direct evidence that Mr. Mecham knew the Lopez car was coming. He 
specifically admitted he remembered he looked over his left shoulder and saw 
headlights. (Tr. Vol. ii, p.942, IL 21 - 25.) Looking over your shoulder is what you do 
when you are looking behind the car. This had to occur as the car was pointed 
westbound before starting the three point turn. If he saw the headlights when the car 
was perpendicular in the road, he would see the headiights by simply looking left, not 
over the shoulder. If he saw the headlights immediately before impact; he would be 
looking almost straight ahead through the front windshield. It was Mr. Mecham;s own 
description of "looking over his shoulder and seeing headlights'' that supports the 
contention he saw Lopez' car before instructing Austin Hennefer to do a three-point 
tum. Even without Mr. Mecham's own testimony, there is ample testimony from 
jennifer Mares that there were cars in the "zone of danger." Given the testimony it may 
take 30 seconds to complete a three-point tum, the zone of danger includes any car 
within 30 seconds. 
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The testimony of Dennis Hennefer and the police photos also address the 
recklessness of Mr. Mecham. The Restatement specifically addresses the slight 
precautions that could have been taken to avoid danger. Mr. Mecham could have 
planned to turn around in the driveway that was "lit up like a beacon" a few hundred feet 
from the crash site. Mr. Mecham could have planned any turnabout maneuver other 
than a three-point turn and minimized risk. Mr. Mecham could have chosen to practice 
icy road driving only in town given the unexpected conditions. Despite Mr. Mecham's 
knowledge of the hazardous conditions, hazardous roadway, hazard associated with a 
three-point turn, presence of vehicles in the zone of danger, and availaoi!ity of safer 
turnabout options, Mr. Mecham demonstrated indifference to the risks. As a 
consequence, Austin Hennefer was killed and Jennifer Mares seriously injured. Mr. 
Mecham totally disregarded his duty to teach the safest practices. 
C. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Introduction. 
The Schooi District contends the jury was not instructed on Austin Hennefer's 
negligence duty, was not instructed on Mr. Lopez' negligence duty, and that the duty to 
keep a lookout only applied to Austin Hennefer and Mr. Lopez. A review of the jury 
instructions given show these allegations are incorrect. Further, under the 
circumstances of this case, Mr. Mecham had a duty to keep a lookout. The instructions 
as a whole properly instructed the jury. Finally, the lookout instruction requested by the 
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School District was highly prejudicial, misleading, and would have been reversible error 
had it been given. 
2. The Jury was Properly Instructed on Austin Hennefer's Duty of Due Care. 
The Schoo! District argues that the Court did not include instructions regarding 
Austin Hennefer;s duty. It is important to note at the outset there are essentially two 
causes of action at issue in this case; a claim for negligence and a claim of negligence 
per se. Regarding Austin Hennefer, them is no claim by the Schoo! District that Austin 
Hennefer violated any statute that would support a negligence per se claim. The School 
District only generaily aileged Austin Hennefer breached a generai duty of due care and 
was generaHy negligent. 
The difference between negligence and negligence per se was addressed in 
Munns v. Swift Transportation, Inc., 138 Idaho 108 (2002). In that case, a horse 
escaped an enclosure and got out on the road and was struck and killed by a Swift 
Transportation truck. The truck subsequently left without removing the horse from the 
road. Sometime later Munns drove along and was unable to see the horse due to 
darkness and struck the horse. As a result of the collision, Munns was seriously injured. 
Munns sued Swift Transportation and the horse owner. At trial the court gave both 
general negligence instructions and a negligence per se instruction for violation of I.C.§ 
49-1301(1) which required the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident to remain at 
the scene "until he has fulfilled the requirements of law." The jury returned a verdict 
finding Swift Transportation 80% at fault. Swift appealed and contended the negligence 
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per se instruction did not apply and requested a new trial. The Supreme Court agreed 
that the statute did not apply and therefore only the general negligence instruction 
should have been given. 
Thus, because the four-part test of Sanchez v. Galey has not been met, 
we conclude that I.C. § 49-1301(1) cannot be held to define conduct that 
would give rise to negligence per se under the facts of this case. We hold 
that instruction 31 should not have been given to the jury. Munns v. Swift 
Transportation. Inc., 138 Idaho 108 at 111 (2002). 
There has been no claim by the School District that a negligence per se claim 
can be made against Austin Hennefer. The Schoo! District claims the general 
negligence instmctio11s did not properly instruct the jury of Austin Hennefer's duty. 
However, a review of the jury instructions given by the court show that allegation is 
incorrect. There were two specific instructions specifically advising the jury Austin 
Hennefer had a duty of ordinary care. The first was Instruction No. 9: 
Instruction No. 9 
It was the QY.tt of Jeffrey Mecham, Sergio Lopez-Rodriguez, and Austin 
Hennefer, before and at the time of the occurrence, to use ordinary care 
for the safety of themselves and each other. (CR p. 207.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
Instruction No. 1 O was given to the jury to define "negligence" and "ordinary 
care." Instruction No. ;5 was also given emphasizing Austin Hennefer's duty as an 
aduit driver and iiability for his own negligence. 
Instruction No. 15 
All drivers, including a minor operating a motor vehicle on a public 
highway, are charged with the same standard of conduct as an adult. A 
person learning to operate a motor vehicle under the tutelage of another Is 
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liable for injuries resulting from his own negligence in operation of such 
vehicle. (CR, p. 213.) (Emphasis added.) 
Although the School District has not made the argument Austin Hennefer was 
negligent per se, it is clear the jury was properly instructed on negligence per se for 
violating I.C. § 49-645, limitations on turning around. (Instruction No. 18, CR., p. 216.) 
That statute specifically applies to "drivers" in section (1). It is apparent the jury 
concluded Mr. Mecham was responsible for the decision to execute a three-point turn 
and Austin Hennefer should not be responsible for Mr. Mecham's decision. 
3. The Jury Was Properly Instructed on Mr. Lopez' Duty of Care. 
As previously set forth above, Instruction No. 9 instructed the jury that all three 
parties including Mr. Lopez had a duty to use ordinary care for the safety of themselves 
and each other. Instruction No. 10 defining negligence and ordinary care a!so applied 
to Mr. Lopez. Therefore, the general negligence instructions were properly given to the 
jury. In addition, Instruction No. 19 gave a negligence per se instruction that applied 
only to Mr. Lopez regarding speed. 
Instruction No. 19 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is 
reasonable under the conditions and having regard to the actual 
and potential hazards then existing. Consistent with the foregoing, 
every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed ... when 
special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or 
by reason of weather or highway conditions. 
A violation of the statute is negligence. (CR., 217.) 
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Clearly, the jury was properly instructed on both general negligence and 
negligence per se liability of both Mr. Lopez and Austin Hennefer. The School District's 
argument must fail. 
4. The Claim the Lookout Duty Only applied to Austin Hennefer and Mr. 
Lopez is not Supported by the Facts or Law. 
In Idaho, a teacher has a legal duty to properly supervise their students. 
Accordingly, we find there is a duty, which arises between a teacher or 
school district and a student. This duty has previously been recognized by 
this Court as simply a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising 
students while they are attending school. Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484 
at 480 (1995). 
Under the specific facis of the driver's training class scenario, Mr. Johns testified 
that a student was required to obey their teacher and a teacher was expected to make 
sure it was safe before ordering a student to perform a maneuver. 
Q: And I think you said in response to Mr. Farley that it's the instructor's 
responsibility to look first before instructing the student to do something? 
A. Correct, always. {Tr., Vol. I, p. 680, II. 12 -15.) 
Specifically with regard to three-point turn maneuvers, Mr. Mecham admitted that 
he too would look to see if cars were coming before doing a three-point turn. 
A: Okay. On a three-point turn what I would have had the students do 
is first we would have to look in our rear-view mirror, and I would have 
looked over my back shoulder - my left shoulder to see if there was 
anybody right behind us. . . . (Tr., Vol. II of 11, p. 924, II. 7 - 11.) 
The .law specifically requires teachers to supervise their students. There is no 
specific law requiring teachers to keep a lookout in a driver's training class, therefore a 
CROSS APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 14 
negligence per se instruction is not available. However, Mr. Johns taught Mr. Mecham 
to look before giving a command for safety purposes and Mr. Mecham understood he 
had that responsibility. Therefore, it would be error to instruct the jury Mr. Mecham had 
no duty to keep a lookout, but the drivers had a duty to do so. 
Where the evidence and facts presented at trial do not support a requested jury 
instruction, it is not error to refuse to give a requested instruction. In this case, the 
evidence does not support Mr. Mecham's claim he did not have a duty to keep a 
lookout. 
Our review of the testimony at trial reveals that there was no evideni:iary 
support for a statute of frauds jury instruction. Mackay v. Four River.§ 
Packing Co., 151 idaho 388 at 393 (2011). 
5. The Regu~sted Jury Instruction Would Mislead the Jury and Preiµdice Austin_ 
Hennefer. 
The specific instruction requested by the School District and rejected by the court 
was misleading and highly prejudicial to the Hennefers because it to!d the jury Mr. 
Mecham did not have a duty to keep a lookout. It was also misleading because it did 
not account for poor visibility due to darkness and the perpendicular orientation of the 
Buick. The instruction requested is set forth as follows: 
The law required that all drivers keep a proper lookout. Vehicle operators 
are required to keep their vehicles under control at all times, considering 
actual and potential hazards. It is not only the duty of the operator to look, 
but it is his duty to see and be cognizant of that which is plainly visible or 
obviously apparent, and a failure on his part in this regard, without proper 
justification or reason, makes him chargeable for a failure to see what he 
should have seen had he been in the exercise of reasonable care. (CR., p. 
146). (Emphasis added.) 
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This requested jury instruction is extremely misleading and prejudicial for many 
reasons. First and foremost, it only applied to "drivers." Therefore, the jury was in 
effect instructed Mr. Mecham did not have a duty to keep a lookout. That would allow 
Mr. Mecham to instruct Austin Hennefer to perform a three-point turn when Mr. Mecham 
knew it was hazardous to do so. The instruction essentially immunizes Mr. Mecham 
from Mr. Mecham's negligence. 
The instruction also is misleading because it required Mr. Lopez and Austin 
Hennefer to both "see and be cognizant of that which is plainly visible." This imposes a 
duty akin to supe, human abilities given the facts of this case whera visibility was poor. 
From Austin Hennefer's perspective, it is unlikely an inexperienced driver wou!d 
appreciate the length of time it takes to do a three-point turn. A young driver would 
likely not appreciate another car 30 seconds away as a hazard. Yet, under the 
instruction, he is held to a strict liability standard whereas the instructor gets immunity. 
The other misleading language in the instruction is the phrase "makes him 
chargeable for a failure to see .... " That language is confusing, It sounds as though it 
requires a finding of negligence per se for failing to see. It is important to note the 
instruction in not based upon a statute. There is no "lookout" statute and therefore the 
very specific instruction is highly prejudicial, one sided, and misleading. 
6. Conclusion. 
VVhere the.jury.instructions as a whole, do not mislead or prejudice a party, there 
is no reversible error. 
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The standard of review for issues concerning jury instructions is limited to 
a determination of whether the instructions, as a whole, fairly and 
adequately present the issues and state the law. Chapman v. Chapman, 
147 Idaho 756 at 762 (2009). 
As a whole, the jury instructions properly presented the issues of both general 
negligence and negligence per se and accurately set forth the law. The so-called 
"lookout" instruction would have been extremely misleading and prejudicial and was 
properly rejected. 
D. CLOSING ARGUMENT 
The School District claims the final argument of Hennefers' counsel resulted in 
passion and pre!udice when there was reference to government studies on the value of 
life, The School District objected. The Court sustained the objection and commented 
that there was no evidence in the record to support the argument.. (Sup. Tr., p. 49, II. 3 
-7). 
Improper statements during closing argument do not amount to reversible 
error if the "objection is sustained and the Court gives corrective 
instructions to the jurt." Bailey v. Sanford, 139 idaho 744 at 752 (2004). 
The School District claims counsel's argument in closing created passion and 
prejudice when there were comments about the School District's denial of any fault. 
(See Sup. Tr., p. 28, II. 5 - p. 3, II. 5.) The School District did not object to the 
comments at trial and therefore waived the issue. 
Vve initialiy note that the defense counsel did not object to these remarks 
either during or on completion of the prosecutor's closing argument. The 
general rule in Idaho is that in absence of a timely objection to an alleged 
error at trial, an appellate court will not consider the alleged error on 
appeal. State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839 at 844 (1982). 
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It is also generally the rule in Idaho that counsel is given broad latitude to argue 
in closing. 
As this Court explained in Leavitt v. Swain, during closing arguments 
"counsel for both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable 
latitude in their arguments to the jury and have the right to discuss fully, 
from their respective standpoints, the evidence and inferences and 
deductions arising therefrom. Bailey v. Sanford 139 Idaho 744 at 752 
(2004). 
Lastiy, the School District claims Hennefers' counsel improperly commented on 
the jury verdict form. (Appellant's Brief, p. 38) (Sup. Tr. p. 89, II. 19 - p. 90, II. 7.) 
However, counsels' rebuttal argument was expressly in response to an argument of the 
Schoo! District. 
I want to rebut a few things that Mr. Fariey said. He said that the Judge is 
instructing you on Austin Hennefer's negligence, and that's true, he is. 
That's because the School District asked him to instruct on the negligence 
of Austin Hennefer. And it's for you to consider, no doubt about that, but 
don't put any weight on that. 
If that's true, then when the Judge instructed the jury on recklessness, and 
· if you look at the jury verdict form, there is no allegation that Sergio Lopez 
was reckiess because there's no basis for that. i/1/e contend the School 
District was reckless because it was, and the Judge has instructed you on 
reckless because he thinks the facts support it. (Sup. Tr., p. 89, II. 19 - p. 
90, II. 7.) 
There was no objection to this argument at trial. Therefore, it was waived. 
Furthermore, the School District invited the rebuttal by making the argument that the 
Court had determined each party was negligent. The School District's attorney argued: 
And the first three questions on the verdict form relate to questions about 
each one of the individuals' negligence that the Court has determined that 
you have to consider. And these are the Court's instructions. They aren't 
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the District's instructions. They aren't the Hennefers' instructions. It's the 
Judge's . . . . Because if there wasn't enough evidence for you to 
consider those three questions, they wouldn't be on there. So it's not what 
the District is trying to do here. (Sup. Tr., p. 53, II. 13-24.) 
The School District "opened the door" and cannot now complain: 
Plaintiffs' counsel's comments regarding settlement with the seller of the 
stove were made in response to Defendant's closing argument concerning 
the responsibility of that seller. Even if we assume arguendo, that the 
mention of the effect of the settlement with the seller of the stove was 
improper, defendant opened the door on this subject by its argument, and 
it was permissible for plaintiff's counsei to respond. Halliburton v. Pubiic 
Service Co. of Colorado, 804 P.2d 213 at 218 (Colo. App 1990.) 
E. PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The School District contends that the legislature enacted a statute that set a cap 
for non-economic damages and that any award above that amount is punitive damages. 
The School District goes on to mistakenly argue that the standard for awarding punitive 
damages is the same as the willful or reckless standard set forth in the non-economic 
damage cap exception. In its tortured and mistaken logic, the School District then 
concludes "permitting the piercing of the tort (sic) cap is a de facto allowance of punitive 
damages. (Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 19.) 
The School District argument is mistaken on all three premises. 1) The jury is 
the finder of fact and makes a subjective determination on a case by case basis of an 
appropriate award of non-economic damages which frequently exceeds the artificial cap 
set by the legislature. 2) The standard of willful or reckless is not the same as the 
standard for punitive damages; and therefore, the non-economic damages assessed by 
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the jury are not punitive damages. 3) The non-economic cap does not apply if the 
Defendant acted willfully or recklessly. 
1. The Jury as the Finder of Fact Makes a "Subjective" Determination of an 
Appropriate Award of Non-economic Damages, Not the Legislature. 
The law is clear that the legislature intended juries to make an independent and 
"subjective" determination of an appropriate award of non-economic damages without 
any influence from the legislature. Only after the jury has made its decision does the 
trial court enforce the law by reducing the jury award if appropriate. If the jury has also 
determined the Defendant acted willfully or recklessly, the jury's award is not reduced. 
This interpretation is based upon a plain reading of the statute. 
(3) If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of the 
limitation contained in subsection (1) of this section. LC. § 6-1603(3). 
The obvious purpose of allowing the jury to determine non-economic damages 
without being informed of the statutory cap is to allow the jury to make a fair 
assessment based upon the evidence and without influence of the cap. This is not a 
worker's compensation case where there are referees following a set formula. The 
legislature clearly understood every case is different. A jury of 12 people is the best 
method of assuring fairness. The right to a jury trial is sacred. 
In the event the jury finds as a matter of fact that the Defendant acted willfully or 
recklessly, the jury's determination is binding. The legislature did not intend to reduce 
jury awards where reckless conduct is present. 
(4) The limitation of awards of non-economic damages shall not apply to: 
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(a) Causes of action arising out of willful or reckless misconduct. 
I.C. § 6-1603(4)(a). 
The legislature also specifically recognized that an award of non-economic 
damages is subjective and therefore differ from case to case, jury to jury, and Plaintiff to 
Plaintiff. 
(5) "Non-economic damages" means subjective non-monetary 
losses, including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental 
anguish, disability or disfigurement incurred by the injured party; emotional 
distress, loss of society and companionship; loss of consortium; or 
destruction of the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 6-1601(5). (Emphasis 
added.) 
The fact the legislature specificaliy used the word "subjective" when describing 
non-economic damages was a recognition of the uniqueness of every determination. 
The word "subjective" as defined means. 
Subjective 1 Based on an individual's perception, feelings, or intentions 
as opposed to externally verifiable phenomena. 2. Personal, individuaL 
Blacks Law Dictionary 10th ed. {2014) 
Clearly, the legislature understood non-economic damages can only be 
determined by a jury on a subjective basis. Every case is different. The legislature 
clearly did not intend to interfere with the 12-person jury's exclusive role in assessing 
non-economic damages. It is only after the jury has made its decision that the Court 
may reduce the award to comply with the cap statute. The Idaho Supreme Court 
explained the relative roles of the legislature and a jury in Kirkland v. Blaine County 
Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464 (2000). 
Nothing in the statute prohibits a plaintiff from presenting his or her full 
case to the jury and having the jury determine the facts of the case based 
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on the evidence presented at trial. The jury is not instructed about the 
cap, and is free to make all factual determinations relevant to the case. 
Once those factual determinations have been made, it is then up to the 
judge to apply the law to the facts as found by the jury. While some courts 
have held this procedure simply "plays lip service to the form of the jury 
but robs the institution of its function." Lakin v. Senco Products. Inc,, 329 
Or. 62, 987, P.2d 463, 473 (1999) (quoting Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 
Wash. 2nd 636, 771 P .2d 711, 721 (1989)), we disagree. In this case, the 
Kirklands had a jury trial during which they were entitled to present all of 
their claims and evidence to the jury and have the jury render a verdict 
based on that evidence. That is all to which the right to jury entitles them. 
The legal consequences and effect of a jury's verdict are a matter for the 
legislature (by passing laws) and the courts (by applying those laws to the 
facts as found by the jury). Therefore, we hold I.C. § 6-1603 does not 
violate the right to jury trial as guaranteed by Article 1, § 7 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464 at 
469 (2000). 
This Court aiso addressed the societal interests served by I.C. § 6-1603. The 
reckless conduct exception should "encourage settlements by giving defendants 
additional incentive to settle." The court also commented on the public interest purpose 
of imposing sanctions on "those bringing frivolous lawsuits." The Court explained the 
legislative purpose: 
The legislative history behind I.C. § 6-1603 reveals the statute was passed 
as part of a larger legislative package aimed at addressing concerns that 
large civil jury veidicts were driving up the cost of iiability insurance. As 
part of the bill which included I.C. § 6-1603, the legislature also included 
reforms to the liability insurance business so Idaho policyholders would 
have more control over the prices and conditions of liability insurance; 
legislation designed to encourage settlements by giving defendants 
additional incentive to settle and by giving the courts greater latitude to 
impose sanctions on those bringing frivolous lawsuits; and some 
limitations on the application of joint and several liability. See Act of April 
1, 1987, ch. 278, 1987 idaho Session Laws 571. Bv striking this balance 
between a tort victim's right to recover noneconomic damages and 
society's interest in preserving the availability of affordable liability 
insurance, the legislature "is engaging in its fundamental and legitimate 
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role of 'structur[ing] and accommodate[ing] the burdens and benefits of 
economic life."' Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 
1996) {citations omitted). Additionally, it should be noted I.C. § 6-1603 
expressly exempts tortfeasors who are found to have acted recklessly or 
feloniously from the limitation of liability. Therefore, contrary to the 
Kirk!ands' assertions, the statute does not arbitrarily limit the liability of all 
defendants causing severe injuries. Because we find the state had a 
legitimate interest in protecting the availability of liability insurance for 
Idaho citizens, and I.C. § 6-1603 is neither an arbitrary, capricious, nor 
unreasonable method for addressing this legitimate societal concern, we 
find I.C. § 6-1603 does not violate the constitutional prohibition against 
special legislation. Kirkland v. Blaine County Medicai Center, 134 Idaho 
464 at 470 (2000). 
2. The Standard for Assessing Punitive Damage is Different Than the Willful or 
Reckless Standard. 
The entire premise of the School District argument is based upon the mistaken 
belief that a finding of willful or reckless misconduct translates to an award of punitive 
damages. This argument is easily disposed of by reading Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 
Fed. 3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2004). Kuntz was severely injured in an accident while he was 
changing a billboard sign. He came in contact with high power electrical lines and was 
eiectrocuted. Prior to trial Kuntz made a motion to include a ciaim for punitive damages. 
The trial court denied the motion. At trial the Judge submitted the issue of whether the 
Defendant's conduct was willful or reckless for purposes of the non-economic damage 
cap. I.C. § 6-1603(4){a). The jury found the Defendant's conduct reckless and awarded 
$19,931,504.00 in damages. Kuntz appealed the Court's decision denying the motion 
to add a claim for punitive damage. The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the trial court's 
decision that the evidence did not support a claim for punitive damages. 
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The Claimant must show "that the defendant acted in a manner that was 
an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, that the act 
was performed . . . with an understanding of or disregard for its likely 
consequences, and the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state 
of mind." (Citation omitted.) The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying leave to amend on the ground that Kuntz had not established a 
reasonable likelihood of proving the requisite "extremely harmful state of 
mind." Kuntz v. Lamar Corp. 385 Fed- 3d 1177 at 1186 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Both premises that the School District relies upon to claim the jury awarded 
punitive damages are mistaken. The legislature did not intend to invade the role of the 
jury and the standard of awarding punitive damages is not the same as only showing 
willful or reckless misconduct. 
3. Jh~ Non-economic Damages Assessed by the Jury Were not Intended as 
Punitive Damages. 
The Schoo! District offers no evidence whatsoever in supoort of its assertion the 
jury disregarded the jury instructions and awarded punitive damages. it is interesting to 
note that the School District makes no effort to argue the evidence did not support the 
award of non-economic damages. The School District does not contest the testimony of 
Mary Ann Hennefer or Dennis Hennefer about the nature of their relationship with Austin 
Hennefer, their 15 year old son. The judge cmrectly characterized the relationship as 
very close. The testimony was extremely compelling. However, the School District 
simply ignores the testimony. The School District has therefore waived any argument 
that the testimony did not support a substantial award of non-economic damages. 
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4. Juries May Assess Substantial Non-Economic Damages. 
As the Court noted, the Plaintiffs provided the Court with numerous decisions of 
awards of non-economic damages in child wrongful death cases ranging from 
$250,000.00 to $9,000,000.00. (Tr., p. 1300.) Additionally, there are reported cases of 
much larger non-economic damage awards in Idaho 
In Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464 (2000) a Federal jury 
awarded a child $15,000,000.00 in non-economic damages and its parents 
$3,500,000.00 in non-economic damages. That was another decision where one of the 
Defendants was found to be reckiess but no punitive damages awarded. in Kuntz v. 
Lamar, supra, the jury awarded $~9,931,504.00 but the decision does not indicate the 
amount of non-economic damages. In _$tate De.Qt of Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 
146 Idaho 439 (2008), a magistrate judge determined an award of $18,000,000.00 was 
a reasonable assessment of non-economic damages in an injury case involving 
paraplegia. The Supreme Court reduced the award due to the non-economic damage 
cap. However, this Court stated: 
It may well be that Jonathan's non-economic ioss was correctly calculated 
at $18 million. However, because of Idaho's statutory cap on non-
economic damages, a plaintiff can recover nowhere near that amount 
either in a judgment or a settlement, absent factors not present here.8 
In footnote 8 the Court references the fact the damage cap does not apply where 
there was willful or reckless conduct. 
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5. Conclusion 
In summary, the jury's award for non-economic damages was based upon the 
evidence of exceptionally close parent-child relationships. The jury was properly 
instructed on the allowable damages. The School District has not challenged the 
damage instructions or the evidence supporting the award of damages. The School 
District's only argument that Mr. Mecham's reckless conduct supported an award of 
punitive damages is inconsistent with the !aw. As a further matter of law, the non-
economic damage cap does not apply because Mr. Mecham's conduct was reckless. 
F: THE SCHOOL DISTRICT HAS NOT PROVEN A NEW TRIAL IS 
WARRANTED 
The School District continues to mistakenly assert a subjective standard instead 
of an objective standard applies to a determination of reckless conduct. However, the 
Hennefers have submitted case law wherein Idaho law foilows the Restatement of Law 
of Torts objective standard since at least 1958. The objective Restatement test was 
used in Hunter v. Hortc,n, 80 Idaho 475 (1958), State v. Papse, 83 Idaho 358 (1961), 
Phillips v. Erhart, 152 Idaho 741 (2012), Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741 
(2012) and !DJl2d Pattern Jury Instructions recommended by a "select committee of 
judges and lawyers" which adopted the objective reckless standard in 2003. 
The School District also fails to acknowledge the testimony of Jeff Mecham who 
testified he recalled "looking over his left shoulder" and seeing headlights coming. (Tr., 
Vol. ii, p. 94, Ii. 12 - 25.) Obviously, if Mr. Mecham saw the headlights immediately 
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before impact, he would not be looking "over his left shoulder." Mr. Mecham saw the 
headlights before he told Austin Hennefer to do the three-point turn. 
This testimony of subjective awareness of immediate danger and disregard of the 
danger is the most direct evidence. Additionally, witnesses testified about the presence 
of other traffic in the area, the fact three-point turns are the most hazardous and should 
rarely be used and turnabouts should not be practiced on high-speed highways. There 
was ample evidence supporting the jury's determination. 
G. DR. GILL'S TESTIMONY 
To make sure the record is clear; the Hennefers have expressly acknowledged 
the School District objected to Dr. Gill's testimony. ("Further, the Cowt entertained the 
School District's objections at trial." Respondent's Brief, p. 33.) Therefore, Appellant's 
reply brief suggesting otherwise is inaccurate. 
A review of Dr. Gill's testimony reveals that she did in fact testify about visibility 
issues. The question and answer set forth in the Appellant's Brief related to the legal 
duty to drive at a speed that would enable a driver to "perceive and react to a hazard 
that may be in the roadway." Dr. Giil actually testified she did not disagree but was not 
sure that question was within her expertise. Dr. Gill's response was direct. Dr. Gill's 
response that she was troubled by the legal aspects of the question was appropriate. 
The School District's allegation that "Dr. Gill would not respond" is unsupported by the 
record. 
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The School District claims Dr. Gill was "trying to divine Mr. Lopez's thoughts." 
The School District fails to acknowledge the testimony of Raul Ornelas describing the 
statements made by Mr. Lopez at the accident scene immediately after the crash. Mr. 
Ornelas testified that because he was bilingual he was asked to interview Mr. Lopez. 
He recounted Mr. Lopez as saying: 
A: (Ornelas) He said after he got on 20 and he was traveling, he said 
he noticed a vehicle off the side of the road up ahead of him. . . . . I 
remember Mr. Lopez was shaking his head. He goes, I don't know why 
they did it, but the car turned in front of me. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 271, II. 10 - 20.) 
Dr. Gill was not attempting to read Mr. Lopez's mind. She was attempting to 
expiain why Mr. Lopez stated that the driver's training car 'was off the side of the road 
and then "turned in front of him." Dr. Gill testified that due to the right curve in the road, 
which was not evident at night, the driver's training car would appear to be off the right 
side of the road. The other expert testimony showed the driver's training car was nearly 
perpendicular in the road at impact near the center of the road. The orientation and 
direction of travel of the driver's training car would be very similar to a car pulling from a 
driveway into the path of the Lopez car. Dr. Gill's testimony simply explained the 
testimony and physical facts previously introduced in evidence by Mr. Maddux, Mr. 
Beaufort, Robert Lauman, and Officer Ornelas. 
The School District also claims Dr. Gill's testimony only related to "Austin's state 
of mind, what he was thinking." Again, the School District is off the mark. The very 
obvious issue in this lawsuit was to determine whether it was unreasonable (negligent) 
for Austin Hennefer to obey the command of Mr. Mecham, his instructor. Obviously, the 
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School District was aware of the contested issue of fact. Consider the final argument 
excerpts from the School District. 
If your decision is that Austin Hennefer was not negligent and that Jeff 
Mecham was, that's your decision. I know ifs going to be based on the 
evidence as you see it. But they were both in the car together. One 
certainly had more responsibility than the other. There's no doubt about 
that." (Sup. Tr., p. 69, Ii. 20 - 25.) 
* * * * 
And then as between Jeffrey Mecham and Austin Hennefer, again, that's 
totaily your decision. And I'm not trying to cop out on this. I mean, it 
literally is totally your decision. They were both in the same car. I mean, 
certainly Mr. Mecham had more responsibility to undertake to protect his 
students, than obviously what Austin Hennefer was trying to do, which is 
just try to follow the instructions of his instructor. (Sup. Tr., -. 71, II. 9 -
16.) 
The School District clearly contended Austin Hennefer was negligent for obeying 
Mr. Mecham. The Hennefers contended Austin Hennefer acted reasonably and 
predictably, when he obeyed his instructor. In support of their contention, the 
Hennefers elicited the testimony of Brian Johns, Jeff Mecham, and Dr. Gill. Each 
witness in effect testified that students were required to obey the instructor. (See Brian 
Johns' testimony, Tr. Vol. I, p. 622, II. 23.) (See Jeff Mecham testimony Tr. Vol. 11, p. 
952, IL 10 - 22) Dr. Gill simply gave a scientific study that corrobOiated the testimony of 
both Brian Johns and Jeff Mecham that students are expected to obey the commands 
of the instructor for safety reasons. Dr. Gill's testimony did not address an issue of law. 
It addressed the issue of fact the jury had to resolve as to whether Austin Hennefer was 
negligent. The Court did not err when allowing Dr. Gill to iestify. 
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H. REQUESTS TO ADMIT 
There are two issues regarding an allowance of costs for the School District's 
failures to admit Mr. Mecham was negligent and Austin Hennefer was not negligent. 
First is a !egal issue of first impression. The Hennefers contend the Court has the 
authority to award costs against a party as a sanction to enhance the efficiency of the 
Courts. The rules are intended to assure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of 
disputes. (See iRCP 1 ). 'These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." (Last sentence 
of Rule 1(a).) Providing a disincentive to unreasonable deniais of requests for admission 
further the role of the Court. 
The second issue is the reasonableness of the deniaL The final argument of the 
School District illustrates the unreasonableness of the denial that Jeff Mecham was not 
negligent. Mr. Farley admitted in final argument, "certainly Mr. Mecham had more 
responsibility to undertake to protect his students than, obviously, what Austin Hennefer 
was trying to do, which is just trying to follow the instructions of his instructor." (Sup. Tr. 
p. 71, II. 9 - 16.) The Hennefers simply agree. It was "certain" that Mr. Mecham was 
more negligent and it was obvious Austin Hennefer was not negligent for obeying his 
instructor as he was required. The School District acted unreasonably when it denied 
the requests for admission, which has resulted in a much more costly and very slow 
resolution of this dispute. 
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I. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Hennefers request attorney fees on appeal for the bad faith pursuit of this 
appeal by the School District. There is considerable case law indicating Idaho follows 
the Restatement of the Law of Torts on the issue of recklessness. It is necessary to 
prove subjective recklessness under LC. § 6-904C2 but that definition only applies to 
Chapter 9 qualified immunity cases. It does not apply to other chapters as pointed out 
in Athay v Stacey. 142 Idaho 360 at 365 (2005). The reasonable man standard has 
always been applied to the non-economic damage cap "reckless exception." Carillo v. 
Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741 (2012). 
There is clearly ample evidence of Mr. Mecham's intentional recklessness given 
the failure to plan a safe route and safe turnabout location, choosing to perform the 
most dangerous turnabout in the most hazardous conditions and location and the 
evidence that he looked over "his shoulder and saw headlights." There is clearly 
substantial evidence supporting the verdict and the School District has chosen to ignore 
the evidence and only address the evidence they prefer. Much of the argument relied 
upon by the School District is in fact inaccurate. 
The faiiure to instruct the jury on the "lookout" obligation most likely benefitted the 
School District. A proper "lookout" instruction would help the Hennefers and Mr. Lopez 
more than the School District. There is no excuse for Mr. Mecham's failure to see the 
Lopez headlights. That instruction would only bolster the claim against Mr. Mecham. 
The evidence is clear Mr. Lopez did see the marker light of the School District car. 
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There was no reason for Mr. Lopez to expect a car off the road (presumably in a 
driveway) to pull out in front of Mr. Lopez. Mr. Lopez had the right to assume the other 
car would not pull out into his path. Therefore, the "lookout" instruction issue is simply a 
red herring argument made in bad faith in an effort to get a new trial. 
The argument the jury awarded punitive damages and that any award above the 
cap is "de facto punitive damages" is totally baseless. No law was offered in support. 
Quick research reveals case law directly contrarf to the argument the iegal standard for 
punitive damages is the same as finding of recklessness for purposes of the non-
economic damage cap. 
The standard for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is whether 
reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the jury. The Defendant must 
admit the truth of all of the Plaintiffs' evidence. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 26.) The 
School District understands the proper analysis but then fails to mention or even 
consider the Plaintiffs' evidence that supports the jury's decision. The School District 
consciously chose to ignore any evidence supporting the jury's decision. it is one thing 
to acknowledge the adverse evidence and argue it is outweighed by the defense 
evidence. However, it is quite another thing to completely ignore contrary evidence 
and pretend it does not exist. The latter is evidence of bad faith. 
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Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear there is substantial evidence of Mr. Mecham's willful or reckless 
conduct and the court properly instructed the jury on the standard for a finding of 
reckless conduct. The School District has not contested the evidence submitted in 
support of the non-economic damages or the damage instructions. There is no basis in 
fact or law that the jury av,arded punitive damages. The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the School District's Motion for New Trial or Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict The trial court erred when it ruled the court did not have 
legal authority to award costs under I.R.C.P. 37 and should have awarded reasonable 
costs for the School District's unreasonable denials. The Supreme Court should award 
costs and attorney fees to the Hennefers under I. C. § 6-91 BA for the School District's 
bad faith appeal. 
DATED this 5th day of September, 2014. 
JEFFREY J. HEPWORTH, P.A. 
& ASSOCIATES 
Jeffrey J. Hepworth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appeliant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 161 5TH 
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Brian K. Julian 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Donald J. Farley 
Powers, Tolman, Farley, PLLC 
P.O. Box 9756 
Boise, ID 83707-9756 
Kent L. Hawkins 
Merrill & Merrill 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
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